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THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE 
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES: 




According to the disciplining hypothesis, globalization restrains governments by inducing 
increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, governments shift their expenditures in 
favour of transfers and subsidies and away from capital expenditures. This expenditure shift is 
potentially enhanced by citizens’ preferences to be compensated for the risks of globalization 
(“compensation hypothesis”). Employing two different datasets and various measures of 
globalization, we analyze whether globalization has indeed influenced the composition of 
government expenditures. For a sample of 108 countries, we examine the development of four 
broad expenditure categories for the period 1970-2001: capital expenditures; expenditures for 
goods and services; interest payments; and subsidies and other current transfers. A second 
dataset provides a much more detailed classification: public expenditures, expenditures for 
defence, order, economic environment, housing, health, recreation, education, and social 
expenditures. However, this second data set is only available since 1990 – and only for the 
OECD countries. Our results show that globalization did not influence the composition of 
government expenditures. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of scholarly investigations of the nexus between globalization and the welfare 
state is impressive and the literature is still growing at a rapid pace. The scientific community 
contributing to this literature is by no means restricted to the economics profession; political 
scientists, in particular, but also sociologists and other social scientists have been strongly 
involved in this ongoing academic endeavour. Even though there can be no doubt that one of 
the driving forces behind this research activity is intellectual curiosity regarding the essential 
consequences of one of the arguably most important economic phenomena of our time, it 
appears that many social scientists are also attracted to the subject because of the public 
debate that the globalization issue has aroused. Since globalization has far reaching effects on 
so many important aspects of everyday life, it is a topic well suited for political entrepreneurs 
to rig the public political discourse and to mobilize political support. The political agents who 
have used the globalization issue as a vehicle to advance their agendas range from well-
meaning public figures concerned about the globalization induced social dynamic, to political 
demagogues and street rioters.  
The worries of the well-meaning objectors to global economic integration originate in 
the conviction that globalization will bring about a loss of power of the nation states in 
general, and a reduction in welfare state activities, in particular. The reasoning behind these 
fears runs as follows: trade liberalization and liberalization of factor mobility, via indirect 
factor price equalization and direct arbitrage effects, erode the developed countries’ income 
and capital tax bases and will eventually give rise to a global tax race to the bottom which, in 
turn, results in the nation states’ fading ability to finance welfare state activities. This 
downward pressure on the supply side of public welfare programs, depending on the 
viewpoint of the observer, reduces the efficiency of benevolent governments (cf. Sinn, 2003) 
and/or disciplines egoistic governments who transform discretionary power into benefits for 
their clientele (cf. Breton and Ursprung, 2002). The so-called “efficiency” or “discipline” 
effect of globalization thus reduces the range and size of government welfare programs. 
By focusing on the efficiency effect of globalization, the opponents of global 
economic integration and unchecked systems competition neglect, however, the demand side 
of the political market. The demand-side effects of globalization derive from the 
governments’ political support maximization motives that direct the political process towards 
a redistribution of the globalization induced economic gains, i.e. losers from globalization are 
to some extent compensated via an increase of social welfare programs. The so-called 
“compensation” effect of globalization thus undermines the “efficiency” effect, implying that   3
from a theoretical point of view the total effect of globalization on the extent of national 
welfare programs remains ambiguous.  
The basic rationale of this argument is summarized in Figure 1. The government 
balances the political benefits and costs of its social welfare activities. On the demand side, 
the marginal benefit (in terms of political support) of the activities decreases as the activities 
are increased, whereas on the supply side the marginal cost increases. Political support is 
maximized at the activity level associated with the intersection of the MB and the MC-curves. 
A deepening or widening of economic integration now increases the marginal cost of 
supplying social welfare programs as well as the marginal benefit via the demand effect 
thereby shifting the two curves upwards (MC0 to MC1 and MB0 to MB1). Whether the 
efficiency effect of globalization dominates the compensation effect or vice versa is a matter to 
be resolved by empirical research. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the nexus between globalization and national 
welfare policies, it is not surprising that much of the respective literature is empirical. 
However, as the literature review in the next section shows, a robust impact of globalization 
on government expenditures does not appear to exist. The reason might be that compensation 
and disciplining effects neutralize each other. It is possible, however, that the impact of these 
two effects depends on the type of expenditure. Therefore, any true test investigating the 
impact of globalization on expenditures has to focus upon shifts in the relevant expenditure 
shares. It is this link between globalization and expenditure shares that our paper deals with. 
We follow the strategy of using disaggregated data and superior econometric techniques that 
characterize the second-generation studies on the globalization-welfare state nexus. In 
contrast to the existing literature we do, however, not estimate the impact of globalization on 
individual policy dimensions, but acknowledge that all policy measures are to some extent 
substitutes or complements vis-à-vis each other, implying that indirect globalization effects, 
working through changes in related welfare-state activities, may play an important role. 
Mutual interdependence is clearly an issue if one focuses, as we do, on disaggregated 
government  spending  since all categories of government spending are connected via the   4
overall budget policy.
1 While previous studies investigated the impact of globalization on a 
range of individual expenditure shares in GDP (see the literature review below) none of them 
took indirect effects into account. Applying our research strategy, we might be able to 
uncover globalization effects that remain otherwise hidden. 
In terms of Figure 1 our research strategy can be illustrated as follows. So far we have 
only considered direct effects of globalization on a particular type of government program in 
Figure 1. If globalization also affects other programs which may have an influence on the 
considered program, these indirect (mutual) effects may cause the MB and MC-curves to shift 
more or less upwards as compared to a situation in which the considered policy shift is 
analyzed in isolation. The dashed lines portray indirect interaction effects that are in our 
example assumed to further increase marginal cost (MC1 to MC2) and to diminish marginal 
benefit (MB1 to MB2) thereby giving rise to a positive total effect (including interaction 
related influences). Figure 1 indicates that the total effect of the globalization shock is, in 
general, composed of a direct effect (consisting of the efficiency and the compensation effect) 
and an interaction effect. Our empirical method is designed to account for these hitherto 
neglected interaction effects.  
We thus estimate whole systems of equations, analyzing to what extent the relative 
importance of specific expenditure categories is influenced by globalization. According to the 
compensation hypothesis some categories may become more important even if the overall 
level of government expenditures remains unchanged. This particularly applies for social 
expenditures. The disciplining effect of globalization, on the other hand, will most likely 
affect expenditure categories whose benefits are not immediately visible, as, for example, 
expenditures on capital. 
In the remainder of this paper we analyze whether and to what extent globalization 
influences the composition of government expenditures. For that purpose we will use two 
different datasets focusing upon different countries, periods and decompositions of 
government expenditures. To further ensure robustness of our results, different measures of 
economic globalization will be used. Overall, we do not find evidence that any of our 
expenditure categories has been significantly affected by any of our globalization indicators. 
In our view, this implies that either the hitherto neglected interaction effects blur the two 
direct effects to a rather large extent, or governments throughout the world have not 
rearranged their expenditure shares as a result of globalization.  
                                                 
1 Interaction effects may, however, also emanate from policies that are not primarily fiscal in nature, such as 
macroeconomic or environmental policies. For globalization induced effects on these policy fields, see, for   5
The next section summarizes the mainly empirical literature on the effect of 
globalization on government programs. Subsequently, we will describe our data and method 
of estimation. Section 4 contains the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature overview 
The earlier literature on the globalization-welfare state nexus (for a survey, see Schulze and 
Ursprung, 1999) mainly dealt with three issues, the first one being the structural tax-
competition effect. Economic reasoning suggests that the tax burden is shifted away from the 
increasingly mobile factors, i.e. in particular capital, when a country becomes progressively 
more integrated in the world economy. Notable contributions are Garrett (1995), Quinn 
(1997), Rodrik (1997) and Swank (1997). The second issue directly addresses the question 
whether globalization has a positive or negative effect on welfare state activities as measured 
by the relative size of the government sector. The third avenue of investigation takes a more 
differentiated approach to measuring welfare state activities by focusing not on the level of 
government spending but on the structure thereof, i.e. on specific categories such as social 
security and welfare expenditures. Notable contributions to these two lines of inquiry are 
Hicks and Swank (1992), Huber at al. (1993), Garrett (1995), Cusack (1997), Garrett and 
Mitchell (1997), Quinn (1997), Garrett (1998a, 1998b), Swank (1997), and Rodrik (1998). 
After having surveyed the early literature, Schulze and Ursprung (1999) arrive at the 
following conclusion (pp. 345-347): 
“The general picture drawn by the few econometric studies available thus far does not 
lend any support to any alarmist view. At an aggregate level, many of these studies find no 
negative relationship between globalization and the nation states’ ability to conduct 
independent fiscal policies. … Viewing the income and expenditure side of government 
budgets separately, a cautious interpretation of the empirical evidence suggests that … it 
cannot be rejected out of hand that the tax structure may have been influenced by the 
globalization process – the observed decline in effective average CIT (corporate income tax) 
rates and the convergence of CIT rates across countries is certainly compatible with such an 
interpretation. … Given the small corporate income tax base and the fact that no shift of the 
tax burden from capital to labour has taken place, it is not surprising that, on the expenditure 
side, no strong evidence points to a significant globalization-induced change of the level of 
public spending. But also accustomed expenditure patterns do not appear to have changed in 
                                                                                                                                                          
example, Tytell (2004) and Schulze and Ursprung (2001), respectively.    6
the course of globalization. This may be due, however, to a lack of studies using strongly 
disaggregated public expenditure data.” 
Many contributions to the more recent globalization literature have indeed taken up 
this implicit challenge and have used disaggregated data in order to focus on specific welfare-
state programs; others have focused on specific groups of countries or have refined the 
empirical methods. We briefly run through some of these studies in turn.  
In a reconsideration of their earlier unpublished study of 1997, Garrett and Mitchell 
(2001) arrive at conclusions that seem to contradict the received wisdom as summarized 
above. Kittel and Winner (2005) and Plümper, Manow and Troeger (2005) show, however, 
that the results obtained by Garrett and Mitchell (2001) cannot be reproduced if the 
econometric model is properly specified. Both follow-up studies rather come to the 
conclusion that government spending is primarily driven by the state of the domestic 
economy and thus independent of international economic openness, implying not only the 
absence of significant efficiency effects but also the absence of compensatory measures. This 
result is in line with the study by Iversen and Cusack (2000) who do not find any relationship 
between globalization and the level of labour-market risks (in terms of employment and 
wages), whereas uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization appear to have 
spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing. Demand for 
welfare state activities thus appear to be home made and not to be induced by labour market 
risks related to international trade. Dreher and Gaston (2005) find that globalization gave rise 
to deunionization. However, in delving further into the issue, they find that it is social 
integration, rather than economic integration, that has been the main contributor to the decline 
in union membership. Bretschger and Hettich (2002), use an ingenious novel measure of 
openness which corrects for country size and find that globalization has a negative and 
significant impact on corporate income taxes and tends to raise labour taxes. On the other 
hand they also find that globalization increases social expenditures. As a consequence, 
efficiency has an impact on the tax-mix, whereas compensation is provided through increased 
social expenditures. Dreher (2006a), finally, investigates the impact of various dimensions of 
globalization on the tax mix and government expenditures. Regarding overall and social 
expenditures, none of the three dimensions of globalization (economic, political, and social) 
appears to have a significant impact. The same is true for average effective tax rates on 
consumption and labour. When it comes to tax rates on capital, however, the result depends 
on how the tax burden is measured. While a globalization-induced increase in implicit tax 
rates on capital is compatible with the data when the average effective tax rates constructed by   7
Carey and Rabesona (2002) are employed, the opposite conclusion can be drawn when one 
uses the legislation-based data by Devereux and Griffith (2003). 
Studies focusing on specific groups of countries usually examine the impact of global 
economic integration on developing countries. Rudra (2002), for example, observes that 
defending welfare benefits under the pressures of globalization is much easier in OECD 
countries that in LDCs where workers are not as well organized and therefore cannot 
overcome their collective action problems. This result points to the crucial role of the political 
regime in accommodating the demand side of the political market. Analyzing Latin American 
countries, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) 
therefore control for the influence of the political regime. The empirical evidence uncovered 
by Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo favours the efficiency hypothesis and suggests that 
democracies may be more responsive to compensation demands than other regimes, at least 
when it comes to social spending on health and education.
2 Avelino, Brown and Hunter also 
find that education is positively associated with openness (as do Rudra, 2004, and Ansell, 
2004), but Avelino et al. obtain a more robust impact of democratic regimes and their 
estimates are generally supportive of the compensation hypothesis; their overall results are 
quite in line with those obtained by Adsera and Boix (2002) who used a more encompassing 
sample of countries. 
Apart from responding to globalization pressures in different ways, political regimes 
may also be linked to globalization in a causal relationship. On the one hand, Richards, 
Gelleny and Sacko (2001) discover systematic evidence that both foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment are reliably associated with increased government respect for human 
rights. This finding is corroborated by Rudra (2005) who finds that globalization in general 
strengthens democracy in the developing world if social safety nets are used to provide 
stability and to build political support.
3 On the other hand, quite a few studies show that civil 
and political freedom in turn attract foreign direct investments (see, for example, Harms and 
Ursprung, 2002; Bengoa and Sanches-Robles, 2003; Busse, 2004), thus giving rise to a 
virtuous globalization-democratization cycle.    
This literature review indicates that there is no robust impact of globalization on 
government expenditures. The reason might be that the compensation, disciplining and 
interaction effects as described in the introduction neutralize each other. It is likely, however, 
that the compensation and disciplining effects vary in size across the various types of 
                                                 
2 Globalization has also an effect on education via migration. This aspect has up to now mainly been analyzed 
from a theoretical point of view; see, for example, Ansell (2003) and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2005).    8
government expenditure. Therefore, the true test for any investigation of the impact of 
globalization on government expenditures has to focus on shifts in the relevant expenditure 
shares.
4 It is this link between globalization and expenditure shares that the remainder of our 
paper deals with.  
 
3. Data and Method 
In order to test whether and to what extent globalization affects the composition of 
government expenditures, we estimate combined cross-section time-series (panel) regressions 
with yearly data. To check for robustness over time, across countries and especially with 
respect to the number of expenditure categories, we employ two datasets. The first data set is 
taken from the World Bank’s (2004) World Development Indicators. It contains data for up to 
108 countries covering the period 1970-2001. Data are classified according to four broad 
expenditure categories: capital expenditures, expenditures for goods and services, interest 
payments, and subsidies and other current transfers. This data is available as a share of total 
expenditures. Figure 2 shows the development of the average expenditure shares over time for 
the largest sample possible. The most prevalent feature of the graph is the increase in interest 
payments over time (from 5 percent to 11.5 percent). The share of subsidies increased from 
28.5 percent to 32.5 percent over the sample period, while the share of expenditures on goods 
decreased from 46.1 percent to 40.3 percent, and the share of capital expenditures from 20.4 
to 15.7 percent. There is thus no obvious erosion in subsidies over time.
5 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The second dataset has been developed by the OECD. The OECD Public Expenditure 
Database (2004) provides a much more detailed classification of government expenditures. 
However, this data is only available since 1990 – and only for up to 15 OECD countries. For 
this smaller sample, the following ten expenditure categories are available: expenditures on 
public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environment protection; 
housing and community amenities, health, recreation, culture and religion; education, and 
social expenditures. Figure 3 shows that the largest increases in shares have occurred for 
social expenditures (+4.2 percentage-points) and health expenditures (+3.2 percentage-
                                                                                                                                                          
3 The results obtained by Li and Reuveny (2003) are, however, much less supportive of this general hypothesis. 
4 See also the recent model in Exbrayat, Gaigné and Riou (2006), who show how trade integration might affect 
the pattern of public spending.   9
points); for public services, defence and economic affairs shares have decreased by 5.2, 3.0 
and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Our dependent variables are the respective expenditure categories as a (percentage) 
share of total expenditures. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, 
the panel is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory 
variables. For ease of comparison, we keep the sample fixed (to those countries and years for 
which all variables are available). Furthermore, we select our sample to only include those 
observations for which these four or ten categories do indeed sum up to total government 
expenditures (i.e. 100 percent). This results in a world sample of 624 observations containing 
60 countries over the period 1971-2001. When we restrict this dataset to cover only OECD 
countries, we have 255 observations for 18 countries over the years 1971-2001. In both cases 
most observations stem from the 1980s and 1990s. Using the OECD dataset, i.e. focusing on 
ten expenditure categories, leaves us with 64 observations for only 10 countries covering the 
years 1991-2001. We found significant fixed country effects in all specifications. However, 
the coefficients of the country dummies are not reported in the tables. All standard errors are 
estimated robustly. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in 
Appendix II. 
To measure globalization, we employ various proxies that have been suggested in the 
literature. The first is openness to trade measured as the sum of imports and exports as a share 
of GDP. The second indicator of globalization is the sum of the absolute values of inflows 
and outflows of foreign direct investment (as a share of GDP)
6 and the third refers to 
restrictions on the capital account. The indicator of capital account restrictions is constructed 
with binary data from the International Monetary Fund’s annual report Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. We focus on four types of restrictions:  
•  restrictions on payments for capital account transactions, 
•  separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some or all 
invisibles, 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 This pattern also emerges for balanced samples, and for OECD countries only. The largest balanced sample we 
were able to construct consists of 46 countries covering the 1975-1995 period. 
6 Ideally, we would like to have the stocks of FDI instead of their flows as a measure of globalization. However, 
fdi stocks are neither available over the entire period under study nor for all countries included.   10
•  surrender requirements for proceeds from exports and/or invisible transactions 
and 
•  restrictions for payments on current transactions. 
 
While the first three types of restrictions can broadly be interpreted as some kind of 
controls on capital flows, the third restriction has been included because current transactions 
can be used to circumvent restrictions on the capital account (Milesi-Ferretti, 1998: 225).
7 The 
respective data has been collected by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Dreher and Siemers 
(2005). 
Our index of restrictions aggregates the four measures. The index takes the value of 1 
for fully restricted capital accounts, and 0, if no restrictions are in place.
8 As an obvious 
shortcoming of this approach is that it neither measures the intensity nor the effectiveness of 
controls. One would also like to distinguish between controls on inflows and outflows of 
capital. We do, however, neither have the data to adequately control for intensity and 
effectiveness,
9 nor the data that would allow an analysis of inflows and outflows. 
Clearly, globalization is a broad concept that cannot be captured completely by the 
three indicators discussed above. We therefore employ the KOF Index of Globalization 
developed in Dreher (2006c) as additional measure of globalization.
10 The index captures the 
three main dimensions of globalization – economic integration, political integration and social 
                                                 
7 In 1997 the IMF changed the format of its survey. Following Glick and Hutchison (2000) and Dreher and 
Siemers (2005) we coded “restrictions on payments for capital account restrictions“ to be unity if controls were 
in place in 5 or more of the sub-categories of capital account restrictions, and “financial credit” was one of the 
categories restricted. 
8 A similar procedure has been employed, among others, by Gruben, McLeod (2001), Bai and Wei (2001) and 
Dreher and Siemers (2005). 
9 To proxy the intensity or effectiveness of capital controls, black market premiums, onshore-offshore interest 
differentials and deviations from covered interest parity have been employed (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; 
Dooley and Isard, 1980). However, those variables measure other aspects as well. We focus on the existence 
rather than the degree of controls and do not use them. 
10 The index has recently been used to analyze the impact of globalization on various economic, political and 
social outcomes. For example, Ekman (2003) studies the impact of globalization on health, Dreher (2006a) 
studies the impact on the size of government, Dreher (2006b, 2006c) focuses on economic growth, Tsai (2005) 
examines human well-being, Dreher and Gaston (2005) examine the impact on trade union membership, 
Bjørnskov (2006) studies the effects on institutional quality, Bergh (2006) analyzes the impact of globalization   11
integration. It is based on a large number of variables that relate to the three main dimensions 
of globalization. These variables have been combined to form six groups: actual flows of 
trade and investment, restrictions of international transactions, variables measuring the degree 
of political integration, variables quantifying the extent of personal contacts with people 
living in foreign countries, variables measuring trans-border flows of information, and a 
proxy for cultural integration. These six groups are combined to form the three sub-indices 
and one overall index of globalization with the help of an objective statistical method – the 
same method that has been applied by Gwartney and Lawson (2001) in constructing their 
well-known economic freedom index. We employ the overall index and the three sub-indices 
here in addition to the more conventional proxies of globalization. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
Figure 4 reports the world averages of the traditional measures of globalization, while 
Figure 5 reports those of the KOF-index of globalization and its sub-components. As can be 
seen, globalization increased over the sample period of about 30 years: The volume of trade 
and foreign direct investments markedly increased, while capital account restrictions became 
less prevalent. Also, the KOF globalization index and its sub-components increased 
substantially over this period. 
Table 1 reports the correlation among our globalization measures. All correlations 
have the expected sign (except for political and social integration where theory is ambiguous). 
However, the absolute degree of correlation varies between 1 and 96 percent. This clearly 
indicates the difficulties associated with measuring a concept like globalization. 
Instead of (or in addition to) being affected by globalization, the expenditure 
composition in a particular country might also depend directly on the composition in other 
countries. Following Devereux et al. (2002), a country’s policy reaction function can be 
written as 
                                                                                                                                                          
on the welfare state, and Lamla (2005) the impact of globalization on pollution. The data and detailed description 
is available at http://www.globalization-index.org.   12
yR y X it i it it ,, , (, ) = −− 1 , (1) 
with yi,t being the respective expenditure category,  y it −− ,1  being the vector of 
expenditure shares in all other countries at time t-1, and X being a vector of control variables.  
Clearly, this equation cannot be estimated given available degrees of freedom. 
Following the earlier literature, Devereux et al. (2002) therefore suggest replacing the vector 
y it −− ,1  by the weighted average Ay i t ij jt
ji
, =
≠ ∑ω . Since countries are more likely to respond to 
countries in their immediate neighbourhood and less so to more distant ones, we employ the 
inverse of the distance between the capital cities of the countries to arrive at the weights ωij .  
The system of equations to be estimated is  
it i it it it it it X A G y y ε η η γ γ β α + + + + + + = − − ' ' 1 2 1 1 , (2) 
where G represents our measures of globalization, ηiis a country fixed effect, εit is an 
error term and i either ranges from 1 to 4 (WB-dataset) or from 1 to 10 (OECD-dataset).
11 
The lagged dependent variable is included because the composition of government 
expenditures changes only slowly over time. The reason for this inertia might be costs of 
adjustment on the part of the private sector or constraints imposed by interest groups 
(Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 2002: 4). We cannot include fixed period effects, since 
they are already present in the weighted average and the lagged dependent variable (see 
Devereux et al., 2002, for details). Note that the weighted average enters the regressions with 
a lag. From a theoretical perspective this is preferable, since it takes time for a country to 
respond to changes in other countries’ policies. Econometrically, this allows estimation 
without instrumenting the potentially endogenous contemporaneous average policy variables 
(Devereux et al. 2002).
12 
A general problem in empirical research when there is no accepted theoretical model 
is the appropriate choice of covariates, i.e. variables entering our X-vector. We opt for a list of 
seven variables to enter our model: real economic growth, age dependency ratio, government 
expenditures, government debt, lending rate and inflation rate. Before including our 
globalization measures, we use a general-to-specific methodology to select only variables 
significant at the five percent level into our baseline specification. 
                                                 
11 Note that our measures of globalization enter the regressions with their contemporaneous values. Lagging 
these variables by one year does not qualitatively change the results. 
12 Dreher (2006a) applies the same methodology to test for the impact of globalization on the size of public 
overall and social spending and effective tax rates on labour, consumption and capital.   13
The first variable – the growth rate of real GDP – accounts for the business cycle. 
Arguably, one may expect subsidies to rise in recessions, while public investments are likely 
to be reduced. According to Aubin et al. (1988), public capital spending is likely to decrease 
when inflation accelerates and to increase with increasing unemployment. As Dreher (2006a) 
shows, social spending is significantly lower in periods of low growth. 
The second variable we include in our basic regressions is the share of under 15-year 
and over 64-year old people relative to total population (“age dependency ratio”). The 
dependency ratio controls for demographic factors. It is expected to vary positively with 
subsidies and negatively with capital outlays.
13   
Our third variable is the total amount of public expenditures (in percent of GDP) since 
there is good reason to believe that the composition of government expenditures also depends 
on its level. In countries with smaller state sectors we expect social expenditures to be 
relatively low, while government consumption is likely to be higher than in counties with 
large state sectors. 
Government debt and the lending rate are included since they directly affect the 
governments’ expenditure behavior. The rate of inflation finally reduces the real value of tax 
revenues which renders expenditure increases less likely. 
Since the individual expenditure categories are not independent of each other – if 
measured correctly, they sum up to 100 percent of total expenditures – and the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variables implies that each equation has a different set of regressors, we 
estimate our equations using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The SUR model 
permits nonzero covariance between the error terms of the expenditure share equations, 
allowing for an improvement in efficiency of SUR relative to the classical OLS estimator. 
There are additional methodological problems. Given the inclusion of the lagged 
endogenous variable and fixed country effects, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in 
a short panel. Especially for the OECD data which are available for only 10 years we have to 
check whether the bias significantly affects our results. To deal with this problem, we employ 
the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) in addition to the SUR 
estimates. The GMM estimator first-differences the estimating equation and uses lags of the 
dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand side 
variables as instruments. Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, the 
equations are over-identified and instruments need to be weighted in an appropriate manner. 
                                                 
13 Overall, however, government total and social expenditure levels are not robustly related to the age 
dependency ratio (Dreher 2006a).   14
We only present results from the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator, which uses the identity 
matrix as a weighting matrix. The two-step estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically 
efficiently using the one-step estimates. However, in small samples like the one used here, 
standard errors tend to be under-estimated by the two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond 
1991: 291).  
 
4. Results 
We start with analyzing the four-category dataset. Table 2 shows the overall significance of 
the independent variables in our four-equation system when using our balanced sample of 60 
countries covering the 1971-2001 period. In each block one of our globalization variables is 
included. The reported F-statistics test whether a particular variable can be excluded from all 
four expenditure-share equations. Table 3 shows the results for the sample of OECD countries 
only. In Table 4 we include either all three conventional globalization variables or all sub-
indices of the KOF index. With respect to the variables selected in the baseline model, the 
only difference is that the age dependency ratio is included when analyzing the encompassing 
(world) sample, i.e. this variable is highly significant in the system; its explanatory power for 
the OECD sample, however, becomes insignificant and is therefore dropped from this 




[Insert Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 about here] 
 
Turning now to the individual impact of the control and globalization variables, Table 
5 reports the individual coefficients and significance levels underlying the results presented in 
Table 4. First, note that the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are 
almost identical; only when showing the third digits, small differences do emerge. For the 
interpretation of the remaining coefficients, this similarity implies that the sum of the 
coefficients of a particular variable across the equations should (and actually do) sum up to 
zero. Given the identical speed of adjustment across all four categories, it must be the case 
that a positive impact on one expenditure share is neutralized by a negative impact on some 
other expenditure shares.  
                                                 
14 We also included the overall index of globalization instead of its three sub-dimensions, leading to the same 
results.   15
For the “world” sample, goods expenditures significantly increase with an increasing 
age dependency ratio, while subsidies significantly decrease.
15 Goods expenditures are 
significantly lower in countries with a big state sector while interest payments are 
significantly higher. This rather intuitive result transpires from the world as well as from the 
OECD sample. Welfare states to a large extent rely on debt financing which implies relatively 
high interest payments. In the world sample, inflation and interest payment shares are 
positively correlated. Since this finding does not hold in the OECD sample, this appears to be 
suggestive for the thesis that especially developing countries’ governments inflate their debt 
positions away by money creation. Note that the inflation rate clearly outperforms the lending 
rate in our sample covering the 1970-2001 period. Inflation and goods expenditure shares are 
negatively correlated.  
Turning to the globalization variables, our results reveal a clear picture. In none of the 
specifications we tested any of our measures of globalization turned out to have a significant 
impact. A potential reason for this result might be the high level of aggregation; the efficiency 
and compensation effects neutralize each other in the rather large categories of expenditures, 
or the effects are blurred by potential indirect effects between the four categories. The only 
solution in such a case is to further disaggregate the different categories of expenditures. In a 
next step we therefore repeat the above analysis using our OECD database which allows us to 
distinguish between ten different expenditure classes. 
 
[Insert Tables 6a and 6b about here] 
 
As can be seen from Tables 6a and 6b, two out of three former baseline variables are 
replaced by others. Besides the age dependency ratio – which was already significant in the 
world sample – the expenditure share in neighbouring countries and the lending rate now turn 
out to be significant in the OECD sample.  
The lagged endogenous variable is positive and significant (at least at the ten percent 
level) in all reported regressions. As compared to the world sample, the coefficients in this 
sample substantially differ across equations. Whereas the lagged dependent variable in the 
housing equation has a coefficient of only 0.06 – implying a very high speed of adjustment – 
                                                 
15 Unless otherwise mentioned, we refer to the five percent level of significance.   16
its coefficient in the education equation has a coefficient of 0.78 which indicates a rather slow 
adjustment over time.
16  
Just as in the more encompassing sample, the percentage of the dependent variable 
explained by the regressors is reasonably high. The only exception appears to be the 
regression on economic affairs expenditures, with an R
2 of only 0.42. The impact of the 
weighted average of the neighbouring countries’ respective expenditure shares is significant 
in the public order (+), and recreation (-) equations.  
Our measures of globalization are completely insignificant in almost all specifications, 
the only exception being the expenditure share on recreation which decreases with increasing 
globalization (as measured by restrictions on the capital account), the impact being significant 
at the one percent level. The share of health expenditures appears to increase with increasing 
social globalization, and the share of education expenditures with increasing political 
globalization (at the five and one percent level of significance, respectively). However, the 
three globalization variables are all jointly insignificant in the system of equations. We 
therefore conclude that globalization did not affect the composition of government 
expenditures. 
In Appendix I the analysis is replicated employing the consistent Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimator treating all the covariates as strictly exogenous. Again we only report results 
for the full models, including all three proxies of globalization. Applying the Arellano-Bond 
estimator leads to a dramatic loss of observations, since information from two periods is 
discarded by differencing and instrumenting. This loss usually results in lower t-statistics. 
Surprisingly, the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are in most 
regressions smaller than in the within groups estimations, although econometric theory 
suggests that this coefficient should be biased negatively in the fixed effects specification. 
This unusual finding could be interpreted as evidence that the bias described by Nickell 
(1981) is not present in the dynamic within groups specification and that the results displayed 
above are valid. We employed a Sargan test to check whether the instruments are not 
correlated with the error term, and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in 
the first difference residuals (because the estimator would not be consistent in the presence of 
second-order correlation). In line with the bulk of literature those tests are based on the two-
step estimator. As can be seen, both tests accept the instruments. 
 
                                                 
16 Note that this implies that the coefficients of a given variable no longer add up to zero across the ten 
equations.   17
 
5. Summary 
In this paper, we examined the composition of public expenditures rather than the overall 
level. Economic theory suggests different kinds of government expenditures to react 
differently to globalization. According to the disciplining hypothesis, globalization restrains 
governments by inducing increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, governments shift 
their expenditures in favour of transfers and subsidies and away from capital expenditures. 
The efficiency/disciplining effect is thus expected to reduce the share of capital expenditures.  
  The compensation effect, on the other hand, is expected to give rise to a higher share 
of social expenditures. The expenditure shift potentially induced by the disciplining effect 
might therefore be enhanced by citizens’ preferences to be compensated for the risks of 
globalization.  
We employed two different datasets and various measures of globalization to analyze 
whether globalization has influenced the composition of government expenditures. For a 
sample of 108 countries, we examined the development of four broad expenditure categories 
for the period 1970-2001: capital expenditures; expenditures for goods and services; interest 
payments; and subsidies and other current transfers. For the OECD countries in the post 1990 
period, we examined a dataset providing a much more detailed classification: public 
expenditures, expenditures for defence, order, economic environment, housing, health, 
recreation, education, and social expenditures.  
Simple correlation analysis already showed that the evidence is at best weak. More 
thorough econometric analyses did not find any significant effects. We therefore conclude that 
globalization has not affected the composition of government expenditures. There are three 
explanations for this result. First, the efficiency and compensation effects might neutralize 
each other. Second, the effects of globalization might be blurred by potential indirect effects 
between different expenditure categories. And third, the effects of globalization might be 
exaggerated in the popular discussion and might simply not exist. 
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Goods Subsidies Capital Interest
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2004). Data ordered with respect to shares.   25
 

























































Recreation, culture and religion Education
Public order and safety Housing and community amenities
Environment protection Economic affairs
Defense Public services
 
Source: OECD Public Expenditure Database (2004). Data ordered with respect to changes over the sample; 
bottom series have largest positive change, upper series have largest negative change.   26
 
















































































Source: World Bank (2004), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Dreher and Siemers (2005). 
 
















































































Source: Dreher (2006c), http://www.kof.ethz.ch/globalization 
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Trade 624 40% -10% 8% 36% 12% -27% 20% -11% 29% 32% 15% 23%
FDI 624 624 -35% 40% 50% 40% 10% -22% 46% 34% 48% 21%
Cap.Acc.Restr. 624 624 624 -70% -67% -62% -43% -48% -62% -36% -12%
Index of Glob. 624 624 624 624 81% 90% 75% 76% 87% 68%
Economic Glob. 624 624 624 624 624 66% 34% 51% 26%
Social Glob. 624 624 624 624 624 624 51% 40%


























































































































































Trade 255 24% -1% 19% 66% -17% 19% 35% -10% 54% 34% 52% 47%
FDI 255 255 -32% 40% 46% 32% 14% -26% 52% 43% 53% 30%
Cap.Acc.Restr. 255 255 255 -65% -49% -46% -47% -57% -75% -46% -27%
Index of Glob. 255 255 255 255 58% 79% 73% 80% 94% 75%
Economic Glob. 255 255 255 255 255 23% 29% 70% 37%
Social Glob. 255 255 255 255 255 255 26% 56%


























































































































































Trade 65 23% -15% -9% 77% -41% 4% 34% -7% 67% 68% 64% 50%
FDI 65 65 -21% 8% 32% 1% 2% -7% 39% 28% 40% 32%
Cap.Acc.Restr. 65 65 65 -53% -39% -35% -58% -40% -23% -40% -38%
Index of Glob. 65 65 65 65 38% 91% 88% 71% 96% 91%
Economic Glob. 65 65 65 65 65 10% 30% 55% 58%
Social Glob. 65 65 65 65 65 65 66% 78%
Political Glob. 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Estimation sample, OECD, 10 categories corrected for country-specific effects
Estimation sample, OECD corrected for country-specific effects
Estimation sample, World corrected for country-specific effects  28
 




Exp.share (-1) 1,035.03 0.00 *** 1,031.58 0.00 *** 1,025.36 0.00 ***
Age Dep. 5.86 0.02 ** 4.66 0.03 ** 4.53 0.03 **
CG Exp. 21.84 0.00 *** 19.85 0.00 *** 20.88 0.00 ***




# Obs., # Cnt 624 , 60 624 , 60 624 , 60
Start-End 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001
  
F-test F-test F-test F-test
Exp.share (-1) 1,085.03 0.00 *** 1,068.36 0.00 *** 1,090.89 0.00 *** 1,074.35 0.00 ***
Age Dep. 5.03 0.025 ** 7.06 0.01 *** 5.41 0.02 ** 5.26 0.02 **
CG Exp. 28.67 0.00 *** 29.29 0.00 *** 28.44 0.00 *** 29.04 0.00 ***
Inflation 18.43 0.00 *** 14.53 0.00 *** 18.48 0.00 *** 18.52 0.00 ***
Index of Glob. 0.01 0.92
Econ. Glob. 1.65 0.20
Social Glob. 0.01 0.93
Polit. Glob. 0.44 0.51
# Obs., # Cnt 655 , 60 655 , 60 655 , 60 655 , 60
Start-End 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001
p-value p-value p-value
World - Trade World - FDI World - Cap.Rst.
World - Cap.Rst.
p-value
World - Trade World - FDI World - Cap.Rst.
p-value p-value p-value
 
Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. ***, 
**, * means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   29
 
Table 3: Significance of variables in system regressions, 4 expenditure categories and 18 
OECD countries. 
 
 F-test F-test F-test
Exp.share (-1) 555.97 0.00 *** 585.32 0.00 *** 584.57 0.00 ***
CG Exp. 12.79 0.00 *** 11.59 0.00 *** 12.03 0.00 ***




# Obs., # Cnt 255 , 18 255 , 18 255 , 18
Start-End 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001
  
F-test F-test F-test F-test
Exp.share (-1) 570.22 0.00 *** 575.41 0.00 *** 563.42 0.00 *** 569.38 0.00 ***
CG Exp. 12.24 0.00 *** 12.65 0.00 *** 11.91 0.00 *** 13.22 0.00 ***
Inflation 20.14 0.00 *** 13.83 0.00 *** 18.96 0.00 *** 25.02 0.00 ***
Index of Glob. 0.02 0.90
Econ. Glob. 0.73 0.39
Social Glob. 0.01 0.93
Polit. Glob. 1.17 0.28
# Obs., # Cnt 255 , 18 255 , 18 255 , 18 255 , 18
Start-End 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001
p-value p-value p-value p-value
World - Trade World - FDI World - Cap.Rst. World - Cap.Rst.
p-value p-value p-value
OECD - Trade OECD - FDI OECD - Cap.Rst.
 
Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. ***, 
**, * means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   30
 
Table 4: Significance of variables in system regressions including all globalization 
indicators, 4 expenditure categories. 
 F-test  F-test F-test F-test
Exp.share (-1) 1,027.34 0.00 *** 1,034.24 0.00 *** 537.52 0.00 *** 521.06 0.00 ***
Age Dep. 5.98 0.01 ** 7.89 0.00 ***
CG Exp. 21.05 0.00 *** 29.80 0.00 *** 12.76 0.00 *** 14.77 0.00 ***
Inflation 17.07 0.00 *** 12.79 0.00 *** 14.92 0.00 *** 11.63 0.00 ***
Trade 1.78 0.18 1.58 0.21
FDI 0.15 0.70 0.19 0.67
Cap.Acc.Restr. 0.15 0.70 0.34 0.56
Econ. Glob. 2.57 0.11 1.55 0.21
Social Glob. 0.14 0.71 0.03 0.86
Polit. Glob. 0.83 0.36 2.59 0.11
# Obs., # Cnt 624 , 60 655 , 60 255 , 18 255 , 18
Start-End 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001 1971 - 2001
OECD sample
p-value p-value p-value
World sample OECD sample World sample
p-value
 
Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. ***, 
**, * means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   31
 






















































































































      
Exp.share (-1) 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
(31.84***) (31.75***) (31.43***) (31.64***) (31.87***) (31.82***) (31.49***) (31.68***) (23.04***) (22.84***) (21.59***) (22.36***) (22.60***) (22.48***) (20.80***) (21.86***)
Age Dep. 0.39 -0.43 0.18 -0.14 0.50 -0.46 0.05 -0.09
(2.44**) (2.86***) (1.30) (1.15) (2.81***) (2.83***) (0.36) (0.68)
CG Exp. -0.29 0.08 0.11 0.10 -0.31 0.06 0.13 0.12 -0.18 0.07 -0.04 0.15 -0.21 0.12 -0.05 0.14
(4.59***) (1.32) (2.10**) (2.05**) (5.46***) (1.21) (2.67***) (2.76***) (3.57***) (1.28) (1.08) (2.55**) (3.84***) (1.96*) (1.42) (2.31**)
Inflation -0.13 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.16 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.10 0.01 0.03
(4.13***) (0.62) (0.69) (3.88***) (3.58***) (0.29) (0.21) (4.15***) (3.86***) (2.44**) (0.65) (0.68) (3.41***) (2.11**) (0.53) (0.64)
Trade 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03
(1.34) (0.71) (0.31) (0.53) (1.26) (0.58) (0.62) (0.88)
FDI 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.39) (0.80) (0.04) (0.54) (0.43) (0.47) (0.11) (0.02)
Cap.Acc.Restr. -0.47 0.61 -0.16 0.01 -0.54 0.07 0.16 0.31
(0.39) (0.54) (0.15) (0.01) (0.58) (0.07) (0.25) (0.28)
Econ. Glob. 1.43 -0.75 -0.72 0.05 0.98 -1.07 0.23 -0.15
(1.60) (0.92) (0.93) (0.07) (1.24) (1.21) (0.42) (0.16)
Social Glob. -0.22 -0.09 0.07 0.23 0.09 0.15 -0.30 0.06
(0.38) (0.17) (0.15) (0.54) (0.18) (0.27) (0.89) (0.11)
Polit. Glob. -0.53 1.04 0.19 -0.71 -0.73 1.07 -0.15 -0.18
(0.91) (1.96*) (0.38) (1.65) (1.61) (2.15**) (0.51) (0.34)
R
2 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.77
World sample World sample OECD sample OECD sample
 
Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.   32
 
Table 6a: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 10 expenditure 










































































































Exp.share (-1)   304.36 0.00 ***   0.63 0.56 0.69 0.32 0.70 0.08 0.54 0.47 0.78 0.35
(7.69***) (7.60***) (10.46***) (4.07***) (6.14***) (1.64) (7.76***) (6.90***) (8.97***) (3.49***)
A_exp.share (-1) 28.12 0.00 *** -0.33 0.13 0.63 0.27 -0.16 -0.18 -0.22 -0.33 0.14 0.00
(1.54) (0.68) (2.55**) (0.95) (0.74) (1.29) (1.32) (2.64***) (0.67) (0.01)
Age Dep. 9.88 0.00 *** 4.48 1.84 -0.13 -2.37 -0.22 0.16 -2.08 -0.21 -0.20 -0.99
(3.14***) (2.92***) (0.57) (1.70*) (1.61) (0.50) (3.35***) (2.07**) (0.60) (0.92)
Lending rate 7.26 0.01 *** 0.51 0.20 -0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 -0.23 -0.02 -0.05 -0.33
(2.70***) (2.18**) (1.55) (0.76) (1.79*) (0.44) (2.83***) (1.83*) (1.21) (2.13**)
Trade 0.62 0.43 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03
(0.79) (0.78) (1.19) (0.73) (0.65) (0.46) (0.45) (0.66) (0.67) (0.61)
FDI 0.10 0.76 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.31) (1.11) (0.07) (0.27) (0.42) (0.58) (0.42) (0.00) (0.71) (0.64)
Cap.Acc.Restr. 0.30 0.58 -1.72 -2.05 0.01 2.49 0.16 -0.20 -0.59 0.58 0.02 1.57
(0.55) (1.44) (0.01) (0.79) (0.52) (0.28) (0.44) (2.67***) (0.03) (0.63)
# Obs., # Cnt 64 , 10
Start-End, R









Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. 
(absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.   33
Table 6b: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 10 expenditure 









































































































Exp.share (-1)   224.77 0.00 ***   0.58 0.48 0.71 0.25 0.64 0.09 0.47 0.48 0.58 0.32
(6.82***) (6.22***) (10.47***) (3.21***) (5.70***) (1.81*) (6.92***) (6.64***) (5.78***) (3.28***)
A_exp.share (-1) 32.69 0.00 *** -0.61 0.12 0.46 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.80 -0.33 0.16 0.06
(2.09**) (0.44) (1.88*) (0.08) (0.49) (0.89) (3.72***) (2.39**) (0.93) (0.28)
Age Dep. 9.36 0.00 *** 4.38 1.74 -0.21 -1.76 -0.25 0.11 -2.38 -0.11 -0.53 -1.32
(3.06***) (2.66***) (0.89) (1.32) (1.82*) (0.36) (3.99***) (1.09) (1.92*) (1.21)
Lending rate 7.80 0.01 *** 0.42 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.23 0.01 -0.03 -0.25
(2.79***) (0.92) (0.86) (0.19) (1.31) (0.09) (3.80***) (0.65) (1.16) (1.90*)
Econ. Glob. 0.11 0.74 -0.66 -0.02 0.02 2.22 0.09 0.47 -0.91 0.22 -0.96 -0.14
(0.33) (0.02) (0.07) (1.20) (0.46) (1.05) (1.13) (1.51) (2.01**) (0.09)
Social Glob. 0.20 0.65 -0.44 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.18 1.13 -0.02 -0.09 -1.02
(0.45) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (1.21) (0.93) (2.45**) (0.35) (0.45) (1.26)
Polit. Glob. 0.13 0.72 0.39 -0.43 0.12 -2.30 0.13 0.03 0.57 0.05 0.95 0.83
(0.36) (0.85) (0.66) (2.24**) (1.21) (0.10) (1.27) (0.60) (4.74***) (1.02)
# Obs., # Cnt 64 , 10
Start-End, R









Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. 
(absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.   34
Appendix I: GMM results 




























































Expenditure Share (t-1) 0.183 0.363 0.548 0.714 0.016 0.145 0.693 0.839
(2.25**) (2.65***) (9.31***) (8.82***) (0.15) (1.66*) (10.07***) (19.77***)
Age Dependency Ratio 0.049 0.168 0.186 -0.010
(0.29) (0.82) (1.4) (0.12)
Government Expenditure -0.396 0.078 0.216 0.072 -0.358 0.145 -0.053 0.169
(3.24***) (0.89) (2.08**) (0.87) (2.88***) (1.44) (1.00) (4.4***)
Inflation -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.008 0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.009
(0.36) (0.23) (0.76) (1.98**) (0.61) (1.71*) (0.72) (3.96***)
Trade 0.013 -0.052 0.022 -0.020 -0.075 0.035 -0.012 0.036
(0.36) (1.37) (0.66) (0.69) (1.80*) (0.86) (0.99) (4.27***)
FDI 0.017 0.002 0.027 -0.003 0.041 -0.020 0.002 0.004
(0.31) (0.03) (0.66) (0.11) (1.34) (0.47) (0.15) (0.16)
Capital Account Restrictions -0.687 -1.241 -0.314 -0.195 0.658 0.462 0.483 -0.894
(0.35) (0.73) (0.23) (0.34) (0.41) (0.21) (0.77) (1.10)
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 5 75 75 75 7 1 81 81 81 8
Number of observations 590 590 590 590 249 249 249 249
Sargan test (prob>chi2) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Arellano Bond test (pr>z) 0.34 0.04 0.63 0.19 0.69 0.62 0.40 0.56
World Sample OECD Sample
 
Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.   35





























































Expenditure Share (t-1) 0.160 0.367 0.560 0.680 -0.005 0.158 0.662 0.841
(2.19**) (2.85***) (10.13***) (7.44***) (0.05) (1.95*) (8.94***) (13.81***)
Age Dependency Ratio 0.085 0.121 0.204 -0.022
(0.41) (0.49) (1.43) (0.27)
Government Expenditure -0.434 0.152 0.238 0.047 -0.279 0.202 -0.070 0.136
(3.34***) (1.57) (2.17**) (0.63) (3.85***) (2.4**) (1.39) (3.59***)
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.007 0.004 0.000 -0.006
(0.10) (0.15) (1.02) (1.50) (1.94*) (0.83) (0.03) (2.61***)
Economic Globalization 1.683 0.253 1.207 -1.932 2.022 -2.527 -0.187 0.193
(1.18) (0.14) (0.94) (1.91*) (1.50) (1.30) (0.42) (0.32)
Social Globalization 0.797 0.612 0.276 -0.435 2.409 0.691 -0.736 -0.079
(0.75) (0.87) (0.37) (0.67) (1.87*) (0.74) (2.29**) (0.18)
Political Globalization -0.436 1.094 0.203 -0.974 -0.282 0.961 0.053 -0.451
(0.73) (1.28) (0.32) (2.49**) (0.59) (1.70*) (0.24) (1.21)
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 5 95 95 95 9 1 81 81 81 8
Number of observations 610 610 610 610 250 250 250 250
Sargan test (prob>chi2) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Arellano Bond test (pr>z) 0.50 0.45 0.48 0.18 0.31 0.23 0.02 0.64
World Sample OECD Sample
 
Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Expenditure Share (t-1) 0.575 0.020 0.522 -0.221 0.744 0.061 -0.024 0.339 -0.130 -0.059
(8.07***) (0.14) (4.87) (2.90***) (8.34***) (1.22) (0.11) (1.42) (1.15) (0.26)
Expenditure Share, Average (t-1) -0.321 0.190 -0.425 -1.768 0.096 -0.066 0.464 -0.085 0.321 -0.939
(1.49) (0.62) (1.61) (1.42) (0.31) (0.59) (0.93) (0.34) (1.65*) (2.40**)
Age Dependency Ratio 1.679 0.606 -0.280 -1.159 -0.092 0.074 -0.493 -0.156 -0.765 2.336
(2.17**) (1.00) (1.37) (2.44**) (1.11) (0.97) (0.73) (1.46) (3.94***) (2.27**)
Lending Rate 0.361 0.155 -0.014 -0.161 -0.030 -0.008 -0.249 -0.006 -0.033 -0.412
(1.39) (0.97) (0.30) (1.38) (1.44) (0.32) (1.51) (0.43) (0.74) (1.95*)
Trade -0.002 0.047 -0.008 -0.039 -0.003 0.004 -0.022 -0.001 -0.002 0.019
(0.03) (2.37**) (1.23) (0.43) (0.58) (0.69) (0.43) (0.13) (0.11) (0.51)
FDI 0.033 0.026 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.003 0.002
(1.03) (1.19) (0.75) (0.20) (1.38) (0.07) (0.86) (0.13) (0.42) (0.13)
Capital Account Restrictions -0.173 -0.842 -0.139 -1.607 0.403 -0.038 0.211 -0.342 0.158 0.721
(0.10) (1.75*) (0.30) (2.50**) (1.25) (0.29) (0.26) (1.36) (0.27) (0.34)
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Number of observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Sargan test (prob>chi2) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Arellano Bond test (pr>z) 0.30 0.20 0.90 0.21 0.76 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.89 0.80  
Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.   37




































































































Expenditure Share (t-1) 0.566 0.112 0.510 -0.139 0.708 0.078 -0.152 0.283 -0.004 0.044
(4.85***) (0.79) (3.83***) (3.51***) (5.55***) (1.74*) (0.73) (1.40) (0.05) (0.28)
Expenditure Share, Average (t-1) -0.239 0.448 -0.411 -0.993 0.145 -0.090 0.047 0.035 0.367 -1.020
(1.11) (3.78***) (1.27) (1.52) (0.47) (0.83) (0.10) (0.19) (2.01**) (2.64***)
Age Dependency Ratio 1.265 0.534 -0.260 -1.021 -0.110 0.113 -0.283 -0.110 -0.624 2.277
(2.64***) (1.12) (1.74*) (2.74***) (1.54) (1.48) (0.56) (1.74*) (4.31***) (2.51**)
Lending Rate 0.400 0.119 -0.051 -0.201 -0.015 -0.013 -0.335 -0.035 -0.026 -0.403
(1.66*) (0.69) (1.19) (1.28) (0.63) (0.69) (2.05**) (2.63***) (0.88) (2.31**)
Economic Globalization -2.421 1.076 -0.567 1.389 0.240 0.441 -1.122 -0.163 -1.461 -0.717
(1.26) (0.89) (1.04) (0.83) (1.37) (1.57) (0.45) (0.43) (2.21**) (0.57)
Social Globalization -1.404 -0.524 0.481 -0.904 0.073 0.287 2.574 0.451 0.054 0.029
(0.86) (0.34) (1.69*) (0.59) (0.32) (1.71*) (1.57) (2.72***) (0.15) (0.02)
Political Globalization 1.082 0.050 0.058 -2.829 0.063 0.084 0.231 0.058 0.893 1.081
(1.26) (0.11) (0.34) (1.16) (0.78) (0.75) (0.37) (0.72) (3.64***) (0.94)
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Number of observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Sargan test (prob>chi2) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Arellano Bond test (pr>z) 0.45 0.19 0.93 0.16 0.56 0.69 0.38 0.22 0.38 0.80  
Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.   38
Appendix II: Data description and sources 
Variable Description Source
Capital expenditure Capital expenditure is spending to acquire 
fixed capital assets, land, intangible assets, 
government stocks, and nonmilitary, 
nonfinancial assets. Also included are capital 
grants. Data are shown for central government 
only and are shown in percent of total 
expenditure.
World Bank (2004)
Goods and services expenditure Goods and services include all government 
payments in exchange for goods and services, 
whether in the form of wages and salaries to 
employees or other purchases of goods and 
services. Data are shown for central 
government only and are shown in percent of 
total expenditure.
World Bank (2004)
Interest payments Interest payments are payments made to 
domestic sectors and to nonresidents for the use 
of borrowed money. (Repayment of principal is 
shown as a financing item, and commission 
charges are shown as purchases of services.) 
Interest payments do not include payments by 
government as guarantor or surety of interest 
on the defaulted debts of others, which are 
classified as government lending. Data are 
shown for central government only and are 
shown in percent of total expenditure.
World Bank (2004)
Subsidies and other current transfers Subsidies and other current transfers include all 
unrequited, nonrepayable transfers on current 
account to private and public enterprises, and 
the cost of covering the cash operating deficits 
of departmental enterprise sales to the public 
by departmental enterprises. Data are shown for 
central government only and in percent of total 
expenditure.
World Bank (2004)
Public Services Expenditures on general public services. Data 
are shown for central government only and are 
in percent of total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Defence Expenditures on defence. Data are shown for 
central government only and are in percent of 
total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Public Order Expenditures on public order and safety. Data 
are shown for central government only and are 
in percent of total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Economic Affairs Expenditures on economic affairs. Data are 
shown for central government only and are in 
percent of total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Environment Expenditures on environment protection. Data 
are shown for central government only and are 
in percent of total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Housing Expenditures on housing and community 
amenities. Data are shown for central 
government only and are in percent of total 
expenditure.
OECD (2004)
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Appendix II (continued) 
Variable Description Source
Health Expenditures on health. Data are shown for 
central government only and are in percent of 
total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Recreation Expenditures on recreation, culture and 
religion. Data are shown for central 
government only and are in percent of total 
expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Education Expenditures on education. Data are shown for 
central government only and are in percent of 
total expenditure.
OECD (2004)
Social Social expenditures. Data are shown for central 
government only and are in percent of total 
expenditure.
OECD (2004)
FDI  Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of 
the absolute values of inflows and outflows of 
foreign direct investment recorded in the 
balance of payments financial account. It 
includes equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital. This indicator differs from the 
standard measure of foreign direct investment, 
which captures only inward investment. Data 
are in percent of GDP.
World Bank (2004)
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product.
World Bank (2004)
Capital Account Restrictions See text. Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995), 
Dreher and Siemers 
(2005)
Globalization, index Index constructed with Principal Components 




    index
Sub-index comprising measures of actual 
economic flows and restrictions, on a range 




    index
Sub-index comprising data on political 
engagement, on a range from 1 to 10, with 
higher values representing more globalization.
Dreher (2006c)
Political globalization,
    index
Sub-index comprising data on personal 
contacts, information flows, and cultural 
proximity, on a range from 1 to 10, with higher 
values representing more globalization.
Dreher (2006c)
Age Dependency Ratio Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents-
-people younger than 15 and older than 64--to 
the working-age population--those ages 15-64. 
For example, 0.7 means there are 7 dependents 
for every 10 working-age people.
World Bank (2004)
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources.
World Bank (2004)
Government Expenditure Total expenditure includes both current and 
capital expenditures. It does not include 
government lending or repayments to the 
government or government acquisition of 
equity for public purposes. Data are shown for 
central government only and are in percent of 
GDP.
World Bank (2004)
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Appendix II (continued) 
Variable Description Source
Government Debt Total debt is the entire stock of direct, 
government, fixed term contractual obligations 
to others outstanding at a particular date. It 
includes domestic debt (such as debt held by 
monetary authorities, deposit money banks, 
nonfinancial public enterprises, and 
households) and foreign debt (such as debt to 
international development institutions and 
foreign governments). It is the gross amount of 
government liabilities not reduced by the 
amount of government claims against others. 
Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is 
measured as of a given date, usually the last 
day of the fiscal year. Data are shown for 
central government only and are in percent of 
GDP.
World Bank (2004)
Lending Rate Lending interest rate is the rate charged by 
banks on loans to prime customers.
World Bank (2004)
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator, 
(Inflation)/(1+Inflation)
World Bank (2004)
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